**London Borough of Waltham Forest (LBWF) and Worknet - a tale underperformance, failure, and the betrayal of local people**

**Nick Tiratsoo**

**Summary**

* From 2008 onwards, LBWF has run a Worknet programme, aimed at addressing joblessness.
* The total value of the programme to date is c. £8-9m., with funding coming from a number of London and central government sources.
* LBWB’s main contractors in delivering Worknet have been first O-Regen, and then Kennedy Scott, Widows and Orphans International, and Reed in Partnership, with only the latter now left in the scheme.
* LBWF specified output targets for all contracts, but its monitoring of what was actually achieved has been at best uneven, on occasion wholly absent.
* However, it is clear that all of the providers – bar Reed in 2012-13 – have performed poorly, with most targets missed by wide margins.
* In addition, it is equally clear that the quality of some of the provision that *has* occurred can only be called questionable.
* On top of everything else, in one case, that of O-Regen, LBWF staff believed that fraudulent ‘double counting’ was occurring, though no real disciplinary or legal sanction followed.
* Faced with their contractors’ failure, LBWF time after time paid out far less than the sums initially agreed.
* The fate of much of the unspent funding remains unknown, but in the case of two contracts worth £4,233,259, it is established (see paragraphs 28, 29, 35, and 36 below) that a mere £267,705 (or 6 per cent) was spent as envisaged (i.e. by the contractor between the contract start and end dates), while £481,773 (11 per cent) was passed on to successor projects, £1,546,249 (37 per cent) was fed into the council’s reserves and general fund, and £1,937,532 (46 per cent) was unclaimed from funders.
* Seeking to provide reassurance, in 2012 LBWF commissioned an audit report on Worknet, but this turned out to be as flawed as the programme itself.
* What makes this depressing litany even more concerning is the fact that many important questions about this whole affair remain unanswered

‘“Waltham Forest have always said our 2012 Legacy…will be…jobs, education and opportunity…Huge strides have been taken towards achieving that…with our Worknet jobs programme”’

Cllr. Chris Robbins, *WFN*, issue 7, 2 November 2009

‘The Council’s Worknet partnership continues to support local people, finding them further training and employment opportunities in a time when many residents need it the most’

*WFN*, issue13, 8 February 2010

‘As an unemployed person I am not suprised Worknet is under scrutiny. I tried several times to register with them, once before a public holiday, to be told they were winding down and would be fully functioning after it, another when I visited their office to be told they only register people on a tuesday morning, got there about 10.00am the following tuesday told I was too late and the registering was finished. Also they spent a lot of time shoving people around to various sub-agencies. If you only have 10 people on your books and 9 of them get jobs you have a 90% success rate’.

Comment on the *Waltham Forest Guardian* website, 13 December 2012

**Background**

1. From 2008 onwards, LBWF has run a programme called Worknet, encompassing a variety of interlinked projects aimed at addressing joblessness in poorer areas, through the provision of advice, training, mentoring, job experience, and employment opportunities.
2. The great bulk of the finance has come from the DCLG’s Working Neighbourhoods Fund, the DWP City Strategy Pathfinder programme, and the GLA/London Development Agency (LDA) – sources worth, respectively, between £5.1 and £3.2m., £2.6m., and £2.8m. (Cabinet minutes, March 2009, June 2010, and September 2010; Rocket Science, *Worknet Partnership Evaluation. Final Report* (July 2010), p.17).
3. Delivery has been by a succession of outside contractors, working either on their own or in syndicates (sometimes involving subcontracting). In all, it appears that some 15 outside organisations may have been involved at one time or another, with 10 at the core.
4. According to a Freedom of Information Act (FIA) deposition of 22 June 2012, Worknet has involved 19 separate contracts worth £9,038,938, with the four biggest beneficiaries being Kennedy Scott (£3,094,876 or 34 per cent of the whole); Widows and Orphans International (£2,007,535 or 22 per cent of the whole); O-Regen (£1,250,319 or 14 per cent of the whole); and Reed in Partnership (£613,395 or 7 per cent of the whole).
5. Today, all that is left of the Worknet programme is the contract with Reed in Partnership, begun in 2011 and lasting through to 2014.
6. In all cases, as far as can be ascertained, payments to contractors were based on achieved results, plus varying up-front sums to cover set-up.
7. What follows summarises some of my ongoing inquiries, focusing first on four case studies, and then turning to some general observations about why the programme went wrong, and the issues that remain to be resolved.
8. As to source material, since LBWF has published relatively little about the Worknet programme, I have been forced to rely almost exclusively on inquiries under the FIA.
9. LBWF’s attitude to such questioning has hardly been constructive, and my experience has often been akin to involvement in a game of hide and seek. Indicatively, even when I have won appeals against LBWF stonewalling, the process has taken longer than specified by the law.
10. What has made the situation more difficult is the fact that, since LBWF’s record keeping has always been rather poor, key documents and series – for example, the records of the Worknet Steering Group and the Worknet Partnership Programme Board, most of the Widows and Orphans International monitoring minutes, and so on – anyway turn out to have gone missing (Agass-Tiratsoo, 18 December 2012, and 8 January 2013; LBWF Internal Audit, *Final Audit Report on Worknet* (September 2012), pp.3-4).
11. Finally, to make matters yet worse, when questioned under the FIA about individual contracts, LBWF has sometimes changed its story over time.
12. Thus, in regard to the number of contracts awarded to O-Regen, early responses listed five in total, later only three (cf. Guilford–Tiratsoo, 9 March 2012 and Boyes-Tiratsoo, 22 June 2012).
13. More notably still, and as will be expanded upon later, LBWF’s initial account of its relationship with Widows and Orphans International recently has been substantially modified, with a significant writing down of the money involved.

**O-Regen**

1. Between 2008 and 2010, the local registered charity O-Regen (which had very close links with LBWF, and Councillors on its board) ran four Worknet contracts, worth c. £202,000, with the start dates being 2 June 2008, 1 April 2009, 1 August 2009, and 1 April 2010).
2. It seems almost certain that *in each case* O-Regen failed to deliver as promised, and indeed on occasion spectacularly missed the agreed output targets (Edwards-Tiratsoo, 28 September 2011).
3. Despite such poor performance, LBWF ran these contracts to their end dates, and paid out about 83 per cent of their total value.
4. During this period, as is now well documented, O-Regen was descending into near chaos, with substantial annual operating losses - £0.5m. in both 2009 and 2010 – foreshadowing its May 2011 collapse into administration (well illustrated in the first and second reports by Maidment Judd, the administrator).
5. However, extraordinary as it may seem, in July 2010, LBWF awarded O-Regen a further contract, this time worth no less than £1,138,383 and entitled ‘Outreach and Employment Support’.
6. In answer to FIA requests, LBWF has been unable to provide some important material regarding the award of this contract, including the documentation submitted by other bidders.
7. O-Regen’s delivery plan involved it doing some of the work, and sub-contracting the rest to CBHA (a local RSL), Prodiverse, and Seetec (which dropped out very early on).
8. When the project started, LBWF officers rapidly became highly critical of O-Regen’s performance, citing *inter alia* disorganization, lack of collaboration between partners, and inadequate information about what was actually being delivered.
9. On 12 August 2010, monitoring meeting minutes recorded that ‘investigations with front line delivery staff have confirmed that they have not been allocated to the project *as made to believe* but are instead reporting outcomes and outputs to other more prioritized funded projects [emphasis added]’, and the same point was repeated on 22 October.
10. On 2 November 2010, a LBWF auditor told the monitoring meeting that there were problems ‘across the board’, and explicitly cited, first, ‘double counting’ (‘Some files contained evidence of Next Step – another LDA funded programme’) and, second, pre-signed time sheets.
11. On 17 January 2011, the relevant Cabinet portfolio holder, Councillor Afzal Akram, attended the monitoring meeting, described O-Regen’s immediate plans as based on ‘fictional figures’, and then took part in an explicit exchange about ‘double counting’. After further discussion, it was agreed that LBWF would give O-Regen notice.
12. However, at the end of the meeting, Councillor Akram indicated that, in spite of what had been discussed, he intended to aid O-Regen obtain further work in the coming financial year (‘From the first week of February Cllr. AA would have an idea of the programme for next year and the funding available. Cllr. AA also said that he would be the facilitator as he would put sub-contractors forward to get in touch with O-regen [sic]’).
13. Indeed, it was clear that, ‘double counting’ or not, important elements within LBWF continued to see O-Regen in broadly favourable terms. Thus, when Kerry Prestedge of LBWF’s Environment and Regeneration department wrote to Julian Martin, O-Regen CEO, on 20 January 2011 to confirm that notice had been given, her approach was strikingly emollient:

Following the meeting between you, myself and Councillor Akram on 17 January…I am writing to formally record that: O-Regen and the Council have agreed that the Council will operate clause H2 of the contract giving notification of a breach of contract which must be remedied. The breach of contract is non delivery of contracted outputs. The following result will be accepted as the remedy of [sic]: Re-profile of contracted outputs submitted and delivery in line with profile [.] It has been agreed between the parties that the 30 day time limit shall be varied to 90 days.[[1]](#footnote-1)

1. Subsequently, such indulgence continued, with, for example, O-Regen’s Chief Executive still listed as a member of LSP Employment and Enterprise Group (chaired by Councillor Akram) as late as June 2011.
2. Turning to the monetary side of this contract, it appears that though O-Regen had failed to achieve *any* of its 14 agreed output targets (Edwards-Tiratsoo, op. cit.), LBWF paid it at least £100,000.
3. As to what happened to the balance of the contract monies (£1,038,383), according to the Council’s Deputy Chief Executive, Shifa Mustafa, it was ‘returned to the Council’s general fund’ (Mustafa-Tiratsoo, 17 May 2012).

**Kennedy Scott**

1. In mid-2010 LBWF awarded two contracts to Kennedy Scott (KS) ([www.kennedyscott.co.uk/](http://www.kennedyscott.co.uk/)) together with subcontractors PLIAS and Lifeline. These were for (a) Specialist Job Brokerage and Employment Support, worth £2.02m over three years and nine months; and (b) Job Brokerage and Employment support, worth £1.07m over one year and nine months.
2. Neither of these were a success. KS started slowly, because of all kinds of quality and ‘staffing’ issues – in August 2010, it registered only 28 clients against a target of 120, and zero job starts against a target of 40.
3. Even after the restructuring of the delivery team in 2011, targets were still missed, and by some distance. According to a paper presented to the Cabinet on 16 June 2010, each contract contained, amongst other things, a target for job starts, and taken together these required that there should be a total of 61 per month. In June, July, and August 2011, KS produced only 27 job starts, that is 15 per cent (27/183) of the target.
4. On 5 October 2011, KS gave notice that it wished to terminate the Job Brokerage and Employment Support contract, winding it down over the *six-month* notice period (Executive Decision by Leader of the Council, 15 December 2011).
5. It is unclear what happened to the Specialist Job Brokerage and Employment Support contract, but it seems likely that it was terminated at the same time.
6. At any rate, in all, LBWF ended up paying KS only £167,705, or a mere 5 per cent of the total value of the two contracts.
7. As to what happened to the rest of the money originally earmarked for these contracts (£3,094,876 minus £167,705, or £2,927,171), LBWF states that

* £208,143 went to section 106 reserves;
* £299,723 went to the Council’s general fund;
* £481,773 went to ongoing Worknet projects managed by Reed in Partnership; and
* £1,937,532 went unclaimed from the funder.

**Widows and Orphans International**

1. LBWF’s account of its relationship with Widdows and Orphans International (WOI) has substantially changed over time.
2. Initially, LBWF stated under the FIA that in July and November 2010, it had awarded WOI two Worknet contracts, worth £2,007,535.
3. However, more recently, LBWF has stated, again under the FIA, that this was an error, and that it only ever had one contract with WOI, which was worth £1,086,834, and ran from November 2010 to sometime in FY 2011-12.
4. Similar confusion surrounds what WOI delivered and was paid.
5. Initially, when questioned about whether WOI had failed to deliver as per contract, Sally Agass (current LBWF Interim Divisional Director Business Employment and Skills) admitted there had been an underspend, and added: ‘The Widows and Orphans contract was funded through an output-based GLA grant and the Council’s general fund budget. The underspend therefore resulted in: 1. A lower draw-down of the GLA grant than originally budgeted. 2. The return of the unspent general fund funding to the Council’s general fund’ (Agass-Tiratsoo, 26 October 2012).
6. Yet when subsequently asked for more exact details, LBWF struggled, and in the end John Turnbull LBWF Director of Finance declared (again under the FIA) that after 18 hours of research (the maximum required under the legislation), he was unable to provide answers, explaining in mitigation that ‘The information requested requires accessing paper archives, electronic files and the Council’s electronic financial records system’ (Turnbull-Tiratsoo, 2 May 2013).
7. Not unsurprisingly, when this response was made public, it attracted critical comment, and so LBWF once again changed its stance, and provided a fuller account.[[2]](#footnote-2)
8. According to Ms. Mustafa, LBWF had paid WOI a total of £617,380 – that is only 57 per cent of the original contract value.
9. As to the balance, the full amount, she claimed, was passed back to the Council, contributing towards its ‘net outturn and the movement in the Council’s balances, which in turn fed into the Medium-Term Financial Strategy’.
10. However, this new explanation only begged further questions.
11. It is notable that Ms. Mustafa did not explain how much was on offer from the ‘output-based GLA grant’, which of course makes a definitive assessment of WOI’s failure impossible to clarify.
12. More importantly, Ms. Mustafa’s assertion that WOI was paid £617,380 is difficult to reconcile with the listing that LBWF posts of monthly payments to contractors worth more than £500 (modified from September 2012 to more than £250).
13. For this shows that between November 2010 and March 2012, LBWF’s environment and regeneration department paid WOI a mere £399,864.75.
14. Indeed, the only way to come close to reconciling Ms. Mustafa’s figures using this source is to add in another very different set of payments, the £211,011.50 that the LBWF ‘childrens service’ paid to WOI in February, April, June and August 2012 – a possible solution, but one that of course raises further issues not only about timing, but also about exactly why Worknet monies were being routed through such an unexpected channel.

**Reed in Partnership**

1. On 12 December 2011, LBWF used a waiver to award two contracts to Reed in Partnership Ltd. worth £613,395, one for ‘Job brokerage and employment support’, and one for ‘Specialist job brokerage and employment support’.
2. As regards the former, which was worth £102,350 and ran from December 2011 to March 2012, Reed in Partnership promised to register 150 people, but only achieved 36 (i.e. 24 per cent), while with its four other targets, which related to job starts and job outcomes, it failed to achieve *any results whatsoever* (Agass-Tiratsoo, 6 August 2012).
3. As to how Reed in Partnership has performed with its second contract, LBWF initially refused to divulge such information on the basis that it was ‘commercially sensitive’ (see Agass-Tiratsoo, 6 August 2012).
4. However, after a Council scrutiny committee started investigating Worknet in late 2012, Ms. Agass supplied it with some of the data, and, after I had appealed to the Information Commissioner’s Office, subsequently sent me the rest – see Appendix One, below.
5. From this, it appears that Reed in Partnership started slowly, and then gradually picked up in 2012, though without fully meeting its targets.

**The Worknet programme in context**

1. On the basis of the evidence that has emerged so far, it appears that Worknet has failed in its basic purpose.
2. For while the programme has no doubt made contact with significant numbers of local people, interviewed them, and provided a portion with basic advice, its record in terms of meaningful job support, relevant training, and real employment opportunities is far less impressive.
3. Measuring the exact scale of this failure is far from easy. To produce clean output data, LBWF paid Meganexus no less than £229,200 for its software programme Neo 3, but then neglected to ensure that it was always used. ‘Client progress’ was therefore typically recorded on a variety of paper forms, but the care with which these were completed varied considerably. For example, an audit at the end of October 2010 rejected ‘a high number of files’ because they were found to be ‘below the required standard, as specified by the LDA’ (Report to the Business and Employment Board, 25 November 2010, p.3).
4. Individual officers knew that they were under pressure to produce – until recently Worknet was a high profile programme, regularly feted by senior Labour Councillors – and sometimes made overly optimistic or unchecked claims about what they were achieving.
5. Besides, LBWF monitoring of outputs was patchy, with the officers involved sometimes seeming bemused or puzzlingly incurious; apparently unsupported if and when they came to critical conclusions; and overly respectful of senior Councillor’s judgments.
6. To make matters worse, few of the funders appear to have taken much interest in monitoring at all, though their exact role is very difficult to establish, particularly because of the demise of the LDA.
7. For their part, contractors clearly struggled with what they were being asked to do, and occasionally lapsed more seriously, with O-Regen’s ‘double counting’ of staff and clients a particularly flagrant example.
8. Against this background, it is clear that all Worknet output data must be treated with a high degree of skepticism.
9. However, scattered evidence is certainly indicative. Some of the meager outputs achieved by individual contractors have already been touched upon, but there are a few more comprehensive series, too. For example, Council figures for 2009-10 show that though the agreed targets for ‘jobs sustained at 13 weeks’, ‘jobs sustained at 26 weeks’, and ‘jobs sustained at 52 weeks’ were, respectively, 755, 379, and 473, the achieved numbers were only 255, 194, and 35, in other words a mere third of what they should have been (see *Worknet Partnership Evaluation. Final Report* op.cit, p.21).
10. In addition, looking beyond the numbers, the programme was also blighted by qualitative issues. For example, one of the O-Regen Worknet projects involved helping unemployed residents improve their CVs. Yet when a LBWF auditor examined what had been achieved, he concluded: ‘Some of the revised CVs were worse than the original’.[[3]](#footnote-3)
11. What explains Worknet’s profound underperformance? Some of the problems that emerged, needless to say, stemmed from the wider context, principally, the economic downturn.
12. However, that said, the fate of Worknet cannot be described as pre-determined, and poor decision-making unarguably made the situation far worse than it needed to be.
13. Dealing first with the contractors, it is clear that some were unprepared for the tasks that they took on, both in terms of management and in terms of competent staff, and their performance suffered as a consequence. There are also questions to be asked about the prices that were quoted in some bid documents, because there is a suggestion that, in an effort to win, some bidders may have come in very low, undermining their ability to earn sufficient profit, and thus compromising sustainability.
14. On the other side of the equation, LBWF’s role in directing Worknet – as has been documented - ranged from the bewildering to the downright unhelpful.
15. Why O-Regen was ever involved in the programme is inexplicable, because in 2008/09 the charity’s recent published accounts (readily available on the Charity Commission’s website, and even submitted to LBWF during the tendering process!) demonstrated unequivocally that it was an accident waiting to happen.
16. But putting that particular case to one side, there is no doubt that LBWF’s more general stance was also flawed.
17. The Rocket Science report of 2010, already cited, is highly indicative, drawing together a pertinent critique which included the following observations:

* providers were confused ‘regarding outputs that could be counted and whether referrals outside the programme were permitted or not’ (p.3);
* mitigating action needed to be taken against ‘unreasonable “parking and creaming” of clients’ (p.4);
* clients applying for help were only registered by post code and date of birth, rather than national insurance number, opening the way to fraud (p.5);
* the manner in which the contracts had evolved over time ‘undermined the propensity for providers to move participants on to provision that may be more appropriate for the participant’ (p.26);
* though the council had purchased a bespoke IT programme to track each client’s progress in a common format, and supplied it to providers, its use was not mandatory, and as a consequence uptake was patchy (pp.29-30);
* ‘contracted partners’ felt ‘disconnected from decision-makers…people and organisations with influence and potentially budgets that could help Worknet achieve its objectives...an important contributory factor being the lack of a Head of Economic Development for a full year and at a juncture that was particularly crucial to the development of Worknet’ (p.38); and
* ‘In the absence of a manual or set of standard proformas, a range of different methods was employed to track and evidence outputs and outcomes’ (p.46).

1. A few months later, in February 2011, the Centre For Economic and Social Inclusion and Shared Intelligence noted of Worknet: ‘The…commissioning process has been slow and bureaucratic, which delayed start up. The borough’s view is that the commissioning process has improved…However, contractors remained critical of the procurement process and contract management, citing delays in payment and a lack of understanding of operational delivery as problems that they had encountered’ (Centre For Economic and Social Inclusion and Shared Intelligence, *East and Southeast London City Strategy Pathfinder Evaluation*, *Final Report* (February 2011), p.61).
2. What makes this all this particularly lamentable is the sense that, even when LBWF possessed clear evidence that urgent remedial action was necessary, it was slow to react, as the trajectory of the individual contracts discussed here vividly illustrates.
3. Indeed, it says much about LBWF’s stance that, in response to recent questioning, it was able to confirm that the Rocket Science report cost £21,719, but could produce no information at all about ‘which Council committees or groupings of officers considered this report, and what actions – if any – followed its submission’ (see Agass-Tiratsoo, 11 September 2012).
4. It is also worth pointing out that for most of the time they were running Worknet, officers had access to the 2009 Independent Panel report into the Council’s mismanagement of regeneration contracts, which analysed what had gone wrong, and offered a wealth of detailed advice about how programmes using outside contractors could be better handled. [[4]](#footnote-4) The lessons for Worknet were there to be learnt, therefore, had there been the will.

**Bringing the story up-to-date**

1. In February 2013, I asked Martin Esom, LBWF chief executive, about his senior management team’s knowledge of, and response to, O-Regen’s failings, but he declined to answer directly, only if my questions were re-submitted under the FIA, noting that ‘the Council is under no legal obligation to enter into correspondence with residents on any matter’ (Esom-Tiratsoo, 27 February 2013).
2. Subsequently, LBWF circulated an internal audit report on Worknet completed in September 2012, which, it pointed out, gave the programme ‘substantial assurance’ (*Final Audit Report on Worknet*, op.cit., p.1)
3. However, close reading of this document revealed that it, too, was critically flawed.
4. The report’s authors admitted, to begin with, that ‘The assurance level awarded’ was not comparable with industry standard, the International Audit and Assurance Standards Board’s ISAE 3000 (ibid., p.17).
5. Moreover, inspection revealed that the report only dealt with the period April 2011 to July 2012, a choice that was unexplained, but of course left out the bulk of the programme, including what had happened with O-Regen.
6. In fact, the report strongly implied that the Worknet programme had started in April 2010, when, according to a previous LBWF FIA deposition, from June 2008 to April 2010, no less than six providers already had enjoyed ten Worknet contracts worth £1.8m!
7. Similar imprecision was evident over funding. The report stated that ‘The Worknet programme is funded by the Greater London Authority (GLA) through the Host Boroughs’ (ibid., p.1), when Cabinet minutes in September 2010 showed that the WOI contract was in fact financed by the very different DCLG Working Neighbourhoods Fund.
8. Finally, the report’s reassuring conclusion was puzzlingly at odds with many of its detailed findings, for instance, the following:

* Worknet contracts contained ‘no procedures…with regards [to] actions to be taken in relation to delivery partners performing below expected levels’ (ibid., p.3);
* in relation to the procurement of the Kennedy Scott contract, ‘no documentation relating to the competing tenders…[had been] retained’ (ibid., p.3);
* there were ‘no documented procedures in place for contract monitoring’, which presented ‘a risk in terms of inconsistent approaches to monitoring on the project’ (ibid., p.8);
* while contract review meetings were supposed to occur monthly, in the case of WOI, they were only recorded as happening twice in 17 months of delivery (ibid., pp.3-4);
* there was no overarching contract file in existence for WOI, contrary to the LBWF Contractor and Relationships Management Guide (ibid., p.12); and
* though the reporting of Worknet performance to an appropriate senior officer group and/or committee on a regular basis would have strengthened monitoring and the ability to respond to problems, no such procedural linkage was in place (ibid., p.14).

1. Finally, there has been some controversy about whether LBWF actually gained from its Worknet failures – that is used programme underspend to fund completely different budgets, much to its advantage.
2. It seems unlikely that such re-allocation could have occurred with GLA/LDA funding, since these monies appear to have been paid in arrears, and only after monitoring of providers was completed and evidenced.
3. However, in the case of the many millions of pounds received from the DWP and DCLG, it is more difficult to judge.
4. For example, the Working Neighbourhoods Fund was aimed at tackling worklessness and low levels of skills and enterprise in deprived areas, and was paid out alongside money from other funding streams as part of each local authority’s Area Based Grant (ABG).
5. ABDs were not ring-fenced, so in theory there was nothing to prevent re-allocation between budgets.
6. Nevertheless, DCLG guidance was that this could only occur within definite limits:

Local authorities, with their partners in LSPs, are free to use ABG as they see fit, provided that they can demonstrate performance against the worklessness-related targets they have agreed with Government in their Local Area Agreement (e.g. reductions in the number of claimants in the worst neighbourhoods).[[5]](#footnote-5)

1. LBWF’s contention appears to be that it received Working Neighbourhoods Fund monies and paid them into its reserves; decided to use them to fund the Worknet programme; subsequently placed provider underspend back into its reserves; and then used this sum either as outlined by Ms. Mustafa in paragraph 45, or, in the recent words of a Council spokesperson, to finance ‘better performing programmes’ (*Waltham Forest Guardian* web edition, 7 June 2013).
2. Needless to say, whether or not this can be substantiated remains to be seen.

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09/07/13

**Appendix One: Reed’s ‘Specialist job brokerage and employment support’ contract**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 20  11-12 | 2011-12 | 20  11-12 | 2011-12 | 20  12-13 | 2012-13 | 20  12-13 | 2012-13 | 20  12-13 | 20  12-13 | 20  11-13 | 20  11-13 |
|  | Q3 | Q3 | Q4 | Q4 | Q1 | Q1 | Q2 | Q2 | Q3 to October | Q3 to October | All | All |
|  | Target | Actual | Target | Actual | Target | Actual | Target | Actual | Target | Act  ual | **Target** | **Actual** |
| Registration | 25 | 0 | 75 | 25 | 113 | 95 | 113 | 205 | 38 | 28 | **364** | **353** |
| Job start | 5 | 0 | 15 | 1 | 28 | 2 | 28 | 31 | 10 | 15 | **86** | **49** |
| Sustained job 26 weeks | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3\* | 0 | 0 | 16 | 0 | 5 | 3 | **21** | **6** |
| Sustained job 52 weeks | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1\* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **0** | **1** |

Red – figures missing from Ms. Agass’ briefing document to the Scrutiny Panel, and later divulged to me.

\* It is difficult to see how these figures can be correct, since at the end of Q4, neither 26 nor 52 weeks had elapsed since the beginning of the programme (12/12/11).

Source: material released to Council scrutiny panel; Agass-Tiratsoo, 14 December 2012

1. Attached to Agass-Tiratsoo, 4 June 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Private information [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Un-redacted minutes, monitoring meeting dated 2 November 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See Independent Panel Report, LBWF Cabinet, 3 December 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. DCLG, *The Working Neighbourhoods Fund (WFN) Scoping Study* (February 2010), p.17. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)